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Introduction
This Synthesis Report is based on the assessment carried
out by the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It provides an integrated
view of climate change as the final part of the IPCC’s Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4).
A complete elaboration of the Topics covered in this sum-
mary can be found in this Synthesis Report and in the under-
lying reports of the three Working Groups.
1. Observed changes in climate and
their effects
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is
now evident from observations of increases in global
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melt-
ing of snow and ice and rising global average sea level
(Figure SPM.1). {1.1}
Eleven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank among
the twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of global
surface temperature (since 1850). The 100-year linear trend
(1906-2005) of 0.74 [0.56 to 0.92]°C1  is larger than the cor-
responding trend of 0.6 [0.4 to 0.8]°C (1901-2000) given in
the Third Assessment Report (TAR) (Figure SPM.1). The tem-
perature increase is widespread over the globe and is greater
at higher northern latitudes. Land regions have warmed faster
than the oceans (Figures SPM.2, SPM.4). {1.1, 1.2}
Rising sea level is consistent with warming (Figure
SPM.1). Global average sea level has risen since 1961 at an
average rate of 1.8 [1.3 to 2.3] mm/yr and since 1993 at 3.1
[2.4 to 3.8] mm/yr, with contributions from thermal expan-
sion, melting glaciers and ice caps, and the polar ice sheets.
Whether the faster rate for 1993 to 2003 reflects decadal varia-
tion or an increase in the longer-term trend is unclear. {1.1}
Observed decreases in snow and ice extent are also con-
sistent with warming (Figure SPM.1). Satellite data since 1978
show that annual average Arctic sea ice extent has shrunk by
2.7 [2.1 to 3.3]% per decade, with larger decreases in summer
of 7.4 [5.0 to 9.8]% per decade. Mountain glaciers and snow
cover on average have declined in both hemispheres. {1.1}
From 1900 to 2005, precipitation increased significantly
in eastern parts of North and South America, northern Europe
and northern and central Asia but declined in the Sahel, the
Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia.
Globally, the area affected by drought has likely2  increased
since the 1970s. {1.1}
It is very likely that over the past 50 years: cold days, cold
nights and frosts have become less frequent over most land
areas, and hot days and hot nights have become more frequent.
It is likely that: heat waves have become more frequent over
most land areas, the frequency of heavy precipitation events
has increased over most areas, and since 1975 the incidence
of extreme high sea level3  has increased worldwide. {1.1}
There is observational evidence of an increase in intense
tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic since about 1970,
with limited evidence of increases elsewhere. There is no clear
trend in the annual numbers of tropical cyclones. It is difficult
to ascertain longer-term trends in cyclone activity, particularly
prior to 1970. {1.1}
Average Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the
second half of the 20th century were very likely higher than
during any other 50-year period in the last 500 years and likely
the highest in at least the past 1300 years. {1.1}
Observational evidence4  from all continents and most
oceans shows that many natural systems are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly tem-
perature increases. {1.2}
Changes in snow, ice and frozen ground have with high con-
fidence increased the number and size of glacial lakes, increased
ground instability in mountain and other permafrost regions and
led to changes in some Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems. {1.2}
There is high confidence that some hydrological systems
have also been affected through increased runoff and earlier
spring peak discharge in many glacier- and snow-fed rivers
and through effects on thermal structure and water quality of
warming rivers and lakes. {1.2}
In terrestrial ecosystems, earlier timing of spring events
and poleward and upward shifts in plant and animal ranges
are with very high confidence linked to recent warming. In
some marine and freshwater systems, shifts in ranges and
changes in algal, plankton and fish abundance are with high
confidence associated with rising water temperatures, as well
as related changes in ice cover, salinity, oxygen levels and
circulation. {1.2}
Of the more than 29,000 observational data series, from
75 studies, that show significant change in many physical and
biological systems, more than 89% are consistent with the
direction of change expected as a response to warming (Fig-
1 Numbers in square brackets indicate a 90% uncertainty interval around a best estimate, i.e. there is an estimated 5% likelihood that the value
could be above the range given in square brackets and 5% likelihood that the value could be below that range. Uncertainty intervals are not
necessarily symmetric around the corresponding best estimate.
2 Words in italics represent calibrated expressions of uncertainty and confidence. Relevant terms are explained in the Box ‘Treatment of uncer-
tainty’ in the Introduction of this Synthesis Report.
3 Excluding tsunamis, which are not due to climate change. Extreme high sea level depends on average sea level and on regional weather
systems. It is defined here as the highest 1% of hourly values of observed sea level at a station for a given reference period.
4 Based largely on data sets that cover the period since 1970.
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(a) Global average surface temperature
(b) Global average sea level
(c) Northern Hemisphere snow cover
Figure SPM.1. Observed changes in (a) global average surface temperature; (b) global average sea level from tide gauge (blue) and satellite
(red) data and (c) Northern Hemisphere snow cover for March-April. All differences are relative to corresponding averages for the period 1961-
1990. Smoothed curves represent decadal averaged values while circles show yearly values. The shaded areas are the uncertainty intervals
estimated from a comprehensive analysis of known uncertainties (a and b) and from the time series (c). {Figure 1.1}
Changes in temperature, sea level and Northern Hemisphere snow cover
ure SPM.2). However, there is a notable lack of geographic
balance in data and literature on observed changes, with
marked scarcity in developing countries. {1.2, 1.3}
There is medium confidence that other effects of re-
gional climate change on natural and human environ-
ments are emerging, although many are difficult to dis-
cern due to adaptation and non-climatic drivers. {1.2}
They include effects of temperature increases on: {1.2}
 agricultural and forestry management at Northern Hemi-
sphere higher latitudes, such as earlier spring planting of
crops, and alterations in disturbance regimes of forests
due to fires and pests
 some aspects of human health, such as heat-related mor-
tality in Europe, changes in infectious disease vectors in
some areas, and allergenic pollen in Northern Hemisphere
high and mid-latitudes
 some human activities in the Arctic (e.g. hunting and travel
over snow and ice) and in lower-elevation alpine areas
(such as mountain sports).
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Changes in physical and biological systems and surface temperature 1970-2004
Figure SPM.2. Locations of significant changes in data series of physical systems (snow, ice and frozen ground; hydrology; and coastal pro-
cesses) and biological systems (terrestrial, marine and freshwater biological systems), are shown together with surface air temperature changes
over the period 1970-2004. A subset of about 29,000 data series was selected from about 80,000 data series from 577 studies. These met the
following criteria: (1) ending in 1990 or later; (2) spanning a period of at least 20 years; and (3) showing a significant change in either direction,
as assessed in individual studies. These data series are from about 75 studies (of which about 70 are new since the TAR) and contain about
29,000 data series, of which about 28,000 are from European studies. White areas do not contain sufficient observational climate data to
estimate a temperature trend. The 2 × 2 boxes show the total number of data series with significant changes (top row) and the percentage of
those consistent with warming (bottom row) for (i) continental regions: North America (NAM), Latin America (LA), Europe (EUR), Africa (AFR),
Asia (AS), Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), and Polar Regions (PR) and (ii) global-scale: Terrestrial (TER), Marine and Freshwater (MFW), and
Global (GLO). The numbers of studies from the seven regional boxes (NAM, EUR, AFR, AS, ANZ, PR) do not add up to the global (GLO) totals
because numbers from regions except Polar do not include the numbers related to Marine and Freshwater (MFW) systems. Locations of large-
area marine changes are not shown on the map. {Figure 1.2}
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2. Causes of change
Changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) and aerosols, land cover and solar radiation al-
ter the energy balance of the climate system. {2.2}
Global GHG emissions due to human activities have
grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of
70% between 1970 and 2004 (Figure SPM.3).5  {2.1}
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important anthropogenic
GHG. Its annual emissions grew by about 80% between 1970
and 2004. The long-term trend of declining CO2 emissions
per unit of energy supplied reversed after 2000. {2.1}
Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) have increased markedly
as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far
exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores
spanning many thousands of years. {2.2}
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (379ppm) and CH4
(1774ppb) in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the
last 650,000 years. Global increases in CO2 concentrations
are due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change pro-
viding another significant but smaller contribution. It is very
likely that the observed increase in CH4 concentration is pre-
dominantly due to agriculture and fossil fuel use. CH4 growth
rates have declined since the early 1990s, consistent with to-
tal emissions (sum of anthropogenic and natural sources) be-
ing nearly constant during this period. The increase in N2O
concentration is primarily due to agriculture. {2.2}
There is very high confidence that the net effect of human
activities since 1750 has been one of warming.6 {2.2}
Most of the observed increase in global average tempera-
tures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the
observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentra-
tions.7  It is likely that there has been significant anthro-
pogenic warming over the past 50 years averaged over
each continent (except Antarctica) (Figure SPM.4). {2.4}
During the past 50 years, the sum of solar and volcanic
forcings would likely have produced cooling. Observed pat-
terns of warming and their changes are simulated only by
models that include anthropogenic forcings. Difficulties re-
main in simulating and attributing observed temperature
changes at smaller than continental scales. {2.4}
Global anthropogenic GHG emissions
Figure SPM.3. (a) Global annual emissions of anthropogenic GHGs from 1970 to 2004.5 (b) Share of different anthropogenic GHGs in total
emissions in 2004 in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2-eq). (c) Share of different sectors in total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004
in terms of CO2-eq. (Forestry includes deforestation.) {Figure 2.1}
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5 Includes only carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and
sulphurhexafluoride (SF6), whose emissions are covered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These
GHGs are weighted by their 100-year Global Warming Potentials, using values consistent with reporting under the UNFCCC.
6 Increases in GHGs tend to warm the surface while the net effect of increases in aerosols tends to cool it. The net effect due to human activities
since the pre-industrial era is one of warming (+1.6 [+0.6 to +2.4] W/m2). In comparison, changes in solar irradiance are estimated to have
caused a small warming effect (+0.12 [+0.06 to +0.30] W/m2).
7 Consideration of remaining uncertainty is based on current methodologies.
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Figure SPM.4. Comparison of observed continental- and global-scale changes in surface temperature with results simulated by climate models
using either natural or both natural and anthropogenic forcings. Decadal averages of observations are shown for the period 1906-2005 (black
line) plotted against the centre of the decade and relative to the corresponding average for the period 1901-1950. Lines are dashed where spatial
coverage is less than 50%. Blue shaded bands show the 5 to 95% range for 19 simulations from five climate models using only the natural
forcings due to solar activity and volcanoes. Red shaded bands show the 5 to 95% range for 58 simulations from 14 climate models using both
natural and anthropogenic forcings. {Figure 2.5}
Global and continental temperature change
models using only natural forcings
models using both natural and anthropogenic forcings
observations
Advances since the TAR show that discernible human
influences extend beyond average temperature to other
aspects of climate. {2.4}
Human influences have: {2.4}
 very likely contributed to sea level rise during the latter
half of the 20th century
 likely contributed to changes in wind patterns, affecting
extra-tropical storm tracks and temperature patterns
 likely increased temperatures of extreme hot nights, cold
nights and cold days
 more likely than not increased risk of heat waves, area
affected by drought since the 1970s and frequency of heavy
precipitation events.
Anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has likely
had a discernible influence at the global scale on observed
changes in many physical and biological systems. {2.4}
Spatial agreement between regions of significant warm-
ing across the globe and locations of significant observed
changes in many systems consistent with warming is very
unlikely to be due solely to natural variability. Several model-
ling studies have linked some specific responses in physical
and biological systems to anthropogenic warming. {2.4}
More complete attribution of observed natural system re-
sponses to anthropogenic warming is currently prevented by
the short time scales of many impact studies, greater natural
climate variability at regional scales, contributions of non-
climate factors and limited spatial coverage of studies. {2.4}
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8 For an explanation of SRES emissions scenarios, see Box ‘SRES scenarios’ in Topic 3 of this Synthesis Report. These scenarios do not include
additional climate policies above current ones; more recent studies differ with respect to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol inclusion.
9 Emission pathways of mitigation scenarios are discussed in Section 5.
3. Projected climate change
and its impacts
There is high agreement and much evidence that with
current climate change mitigation policies and related sus-
tainable development practices, global GHG emissions
will continue to grow over the next few decades. {3.1}
The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES,
2000) projects an increase of global GHG emissions by 25 to
90% (CO2-eq) between 2000 and 2030 (Figure SPM.5), with
fossil fuels maintaining their dominant position in the global en-
ergy mix to 2030 and beyond. More recent scenarios without
additional emissions mitigation are comparable in range.8,9  {3.1}
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates
would cause further warming and induce many changes
in the global climate system during the 21st century that
would very likely be larger than those observed during
the 20th century (Table SPM.1, Figure SPM.5). {3.2.1}
For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C per de-
cade is projected for a range of SRES emissions scenarios. Even
if the concentrations of all GHGs and aerosols had been kept
constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of about 0.1°C
per decade would be expected. Afterwards, temperature projec-
tions increasingly depend on specific emissions scenarios. {3.2}
The range of projections (Table SPM.1) is broadly con-
sistent with the TAR, but uncertainties and upper ranges for
temperature are larger mainly because the broader range of
available models suggests stronger climate-carbon cycle feed-
backs. Warming reduces terrestrial and ocean uptake of atmo-
spheric CO2, increasing the fraction of anthropogenic emis-
sions remaining in the atmosphere. The strength of this feed-
back effect varies markedly among models. {2.3, 3.2.1}
Because understanding of some important effects driving
sea level rise is too limited, this report does not assess the
likelihood, nor provide a best estimate or an upper bound for
sea level rise. Table SPM.1 shows model-based projections
Scenarios for GHG emissions from 2000 to 2100 (in the absence of additional climate policies)
and projections of surface temperatures
Figure SPM.5. Left Panel: Global GHG emissions (in GtCO2-eq) in the absence of climate policies: six illustrative SRES marker scenarios
(coloured lines) and the 80th percentile range of recent scenarios published since SRES (post-SRES) (gray shaded area). Dashed lines show the
full range of post-SRES scenarios. The emissions include CO2, CH4, N2O and F-gases. Right Panel: Solid lines are multi-model global averages
of surface warming for scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown as continuations of the 20th-century simulations. These projections also take into
account emissions of short-lived GHGs and aerosols. The pink line is not a scenario, but is for Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model
(AOGCM) simulations where atmospheric concentrations are held constant at year 2000 values. The bars at the right of the figure indicate the
best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six SRES marker scenarios at 2090-2099. All temperatures are
relative to the period 1980-1999. {Figures 3.1 and 3.2}
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10 TAR projections were made for 2100, whereas the projections for this report are for 2090-2099. The TAR would have had similar ranges to
those in Table SPM.1 if it had treated uncertainties in the same way.
11 For discussion of the longer term, see material below.
of global average sea level rise for 2090-2099.10  The projec-
tions do not include uncertainties in climate-carbon cycle feed-
backs nor the full effects of changes in ice sheet flow, there-
fore the upper values of the ranges are not to be considered
upper bounds for sea level rise. They include a contribution
from increased Greenland and Antarctic ice flow at the rates
observed for 1993-2003, but this could increase or decrease
in the future.11  {3.2.1}
There is now higher confidence than in the TAR in pro-
jected patterns of warming and other regional-scale
features, including changes in wind patterns, precipi-
tation and some aspects of extremes and sea ice. {3.2.2}
Regional-scale changes include: {3.2.2}
 warming greatest over land and at most high northern lati-
tudes and least over Southern Ocean and parts of the North
Atlantic Ocean, continuing recent observed trends (Fig-
ure SPM.6)
 contraction of snow cover area, increases in thaw depth
over most permafrost regions and decrease in sea ice ex-
tent; in some projections using SRES scenarios, Arctic
late-summer sea ice disappears almost entirely by the lat-
ter part of the 21st century
 very likely increase in frequency of hot extremes, heat
waves and heavy precipitation
 likely increase in tropical cyclone intensity; less confidence
in global decrease of tropical cyclone numbers
 poleward shift of extra-tropical storm tracks with conse-
quent changes in wind, precipitation and temperature pat-
terns
 very likely precipitation increases in high latitudes and
likely decreases in most subtropical land regions, continu-
ing observed recent trends.
There is high confidence that by mid-century, annual river
runoff and water availability are projected to increase at high
latitudes (and in some tropical wet areas) and decrease in some
dry regions in the mid-latitudes and tropics. There is also high
confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. Mediterranean
Basin, western United States, southern Africa and
north-eastern Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources
due to climate change. {3.3.1, Figure 3.5}
Studies since the TAR have enabled more systematic
understanding of the timing and magnitude of impacts
related to differing amounts and rates of climate
change. {3.3.1, 3.3.2}
Figure SPM.7 presents examples of this new information
for systems and sectors. The top panel shows impacts increas-
ing with increasing temperature change. Their estimated mag-
nitude and timing is also affected by development pathway
(lower panel). {3.3.1}
Examples of some projected impacts for different regions
are given in Table SPM.2.
Table SPM.1.  Projected global average surface warming and sea level rise at the end of the 21st century. {Table 3.1}
Temperature change Sea level rise
(°C at 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999) a, d (m at 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999)
Case Best estimate Likely range Model-based range
excluding future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow
Constant year 2000
concentrationsb 0.6 0.3 – 0.9 Not available
B1 scenario 1.8 1.1 – 2.9 0.18 – 0.38
A1T scenario 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 0.20 – 0.45
B2 scenario 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 0.20 – 0.43
A1B scenario 2.8 1.7 – 4.4 0.21 – 0.48
A2 scenario 3.4 2.0 – 5.4 0.23 – 0.51
A1FI scenario 4.0 2.4 – 6.4 0.26 – 0.59
Notes:
a) Temperatures are assessed best estimates and likely uncertainty ranges from a hierarchy of models of varying complexity as well as
observational constraints.
b) Year 2000 constant composition is derived from Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) only.
c) All scenarios above are six SRES marker scenarios. Approximate CO2-eq concentrations corresponding to the computed radiative
forcing due to anthropogenic GHGs and aerosols in 2100 (see p. 823 of the Working Group I TAR) for the SRES B1, AIT, B2, A1B, A2
and A1FI illustrative marker scenarios are about 600, 700, 800, 850, 1250 and 1550ppm, respectively.
d) Temperature changes are expressed as the difference from the period 1980-1999. To express the change relative to the period 1850-
1899 add 0.5°C.
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Geographical pattern of surface warming
Figure SPM.6. Projected surface temperature changes for the late 21st century (2090-2099). The map shows the multi-AOGCM average projec-
tion for the A1B SRES scenario. Temperatures are relative to the period 1980-1999. {Figure 3.2}
Some systems, sectors and regions are likely to be espe-
cially affected by climate change.12  {3.3.3}
Systems and sectors: {3.3.3}
 particular ecosystems:
- terrestrial: tundra, boreal forest and mountain regions
because of sensitivity to warming; mediterranean-type
ecosystems because of reduction in rainfall; and tropi-
cal rainforests where precipitation declines
- coastal: mangroves and salt marshes, due to multiple
stresses
- marine: coral reefs due to multiple stresses; the sea ice
biome because of sensitivity to warming
 water resources in some dry regions at mid-latitudes13  and
in the dry tropics, due to changes in rainfall and evapo-
transpiration, and in areas dependent on snow and ice melt
 agriculture in low latitudes, due to reduced water avail-
ability
 low-lying coastal systems, due to threat of sea level rise
and increased risk from extreme weather events
 human health in populations with low adaptive capacity.
Regions: {3.3.3}
 the Arctic, because of the impacts of high rates of projected
warming on natural systems and human communities
 Africa, because of low adaptive capacity and projected
climate change impacts
 small islands, where there is high exposure of population
and infrastructure to projected climate change impacts
 Asian and African megadeltas, due to large populations
and high exposure to sea level rise, storm surges and river
flooding.
Within other areas, even those with high incomes, some
people (such as the poor, young children and the elderly) can
be particularly at risk, and also some areas and some activi-
ties. {3.3.3}
Ocean acidification
The uptake of anthropogenic carbon since 1750 has led to
the ocean becoming more acidic with an average decrease in
pH of 0.1 units. Increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations
lead to further acidification. Projections based on SRES sce-
narios give a reduction in average global surface ocean pH of
between 0.14 and 0.35 units over the 21st century. While the ef-
fects of observed ocean acidification on the marine biosphere are
as yet undocumented, the progressive acidification of oceans is
expected to have negative impacts on marine shell-forming or-
ganisms (e.g. corals) and their dependent species. {3.3.4}
12 Identified on the basis of expert judgement of the assessed literature and considering the magnitude, timing and projected rate of climate
change, sensitivity and adaptive capacity.
13 Including arid and semi-arid regions.
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Examples of impacts associated with global average temperature change
(Impacts will vary by extent of adaptation, rate of temperature change and socio-economic pathway)
Figure SPM.7. Examples of impacts associated with projected global average surface warming. Upper panel: Illustrative examples of global
impacts projected for climate changes (and sea level and atmospheric CO2 where relevant) associated with different amounts of increase in
global average surface temperature in the 21st century. The black lines link impacts; broken-line arrows indicate impacts continuing with increas-
ing temperature. Entries are placed so that the left-hand side of text indicates the approximate level of warming that is associated with the onset
of a given impact. Quantitative entries for water scarcity and flooding represent the additional impacts of climate change relative to the conditions
projected across the range of SRES scenarios A1FI, A2, B1 and B2. Adaptation to climate change is not included in these estimations. Confi-
dence levels for all statements are high. Lower panel: Dots and bars indicate the best estimate and likely ranges of warming assessed for the
six SRES marker scenarios for 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999. {Figure 3.6}
Warming by 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999 for non-mitigation scenarios
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† Significant is defined here as more than 40%.      ‡ Based on average rate of sea level rise of 4.2mm/year from 2000 to 2080.
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Table SPM.2. Examples of some projected regional impacts. {3.3.2}
Africa  By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to
climate change.
 By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%. Agricultural
production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This
would further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition.
 Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with large
populations. The cost of adaptation could amount to at least 5 to 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
 By 2080, an increase of 5 to 8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a range of climate
scenarios (TS).
Asia  By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East Asia, particularly in large river
basins, is projected to decrease.
 Coastal areas, especially heavily populated megadelta regions in South, East and South-East Asia, will be at
greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some megadeltas, flooding from the rivers.
 Climate change is projected to compound the pressures on natural resources and the environment
associated with rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and economic development.
 Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease primarily associated with floods and droughts
are expected to rise in East, South and South-East Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle.
Australia and  By 2020, significant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur in some ecologically rich sites, including the
New Zealand Great Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics.
 By 2030, water security problems are projected to intensify in southern and eastern Australia and, in
New Zealand, in Northland and some eastern regions.
 By 2030, production from agriculture and forestry is projected to decline over much of southern and
eastern Australia, and over parts of eastern New Zealand, due to increased drought and fire. However, in
New Zealand, initial benefits are projected in some other regions.
 By 2050, ongoing coastal development and population growth in some areas of Australia and New Zealand
are projected to exacerbate risks from sea level rise and increases in the severity and frequency of storms
and coastal flooding.
Europe  Climate change is expected to magnify regional differences in Europe’s natural resources and assets.
Negative impacts will include increased risk of inland flash floods and more frequent coastal flooding and
increased erosion (due to storminess and sea level rise).
 Mountainous areas will face glacier retreat, reduced snow cover and winter tourism, and extensive species
losses (in some areas up to 60% under high emissions scenarios by 2080).
 In southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in
a region already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, hydropower potential,
summer tourism and, in general, crop productivity.
 Climate change is also projected to increase the health risks due to heat waves and the frequency of wildfires.
Latin America  By mid-century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are projected to lead to
gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to
be replaced by arid-land vegetation.
 There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America.
 Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with
adverse consequences for food security. In temperate zones, soybean yields are projected to increase.
Overall, the number of people at risk of hunger is projected to increase (TS; medium confidence).
 Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect
water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation.
North America  Warming in western mountains is projected to cause decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and
reduced summer flows, exacerbating competition for over-allocated water resources.
 In the early decades of the century, moderate climate change is projected to increase aggregate yields of
rain-fed agriculture by 5 to 20%, but with important variability among regions. Major challenges are
projected for crops that are near the warm end of their suitable range or which depend on highly utilised
water resources.
 Cities that currently experience heat waves are expected to be further challenged by an increased
number, intensity and duration of heat waves during the course of the century, with potential for adverse
health impacts.
 Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts interacting
with development and pollution.
continued...
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Altered frequencies and intensities of extreme weather,
together with sea level rise, are expected to have mostly
adverse effects on natural and human systems. {3.3.5}
Examples for selected extremes and sectors are shown in
Table SPM.3.
Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would con-
tinue for centuries due to the time scales associated
with climate processes and feedbacks, even if GHG
concentrations were to be stabilised. {3.2.3}
Estimated long-term (multi-century) warming correspond-
ing to the six AR4 Working Group III stabilisation categories
is shown in Figure SPM.8.
Contraction of the Greenland ice sheet is projected to con-
tinue to contribute to sea level rise after 2100. Current models
suggest virtually complete elimination of the Greenland ice
sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7m
if global average warming were sustained for millennia in
excess of 1.9 to 4.6°C relative to pre-industrial values. The
corresponding future temperatures in Greenland are compa-
rable to those inferred for the last interglacial period 125,000
years ago, when palaeoclimatic information suggests reductions
of polar land ice extent and 4 to 6m of sea level rise. {3.2.3}
Current global model studies project that the Antarctic ice
sheet will remain too cold for widespread surface melting and
gain mass due to increased snowfall. However, net loss of ice
mass could occur if dynamical ice discharge dominates the
ice sheet mass balance. {3.2.3}
Table SPM.2. continued...
Polar Regions  The main projected biophysical effects are reductions in thickness and extent of glaciers, ice sheets
and sea ice, and changes in natural ecosystems with detrimental effects on many organisms including
migratory birds, mammals and higher predators.
 For human communities in the Arctic, impacts, particularly those resulting from changing snow and ice
conditions, are projected to be mixed.
 Detrimental impacts would include those on infrastructure and traditional indigenous ways of life.
 In both polar regions, specific ecosystems and habitats are projected to be vulnerable, as climatic barriers to
species invasions are lowered.
 Small Islands  Sea level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus
threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island communities.
 Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of beaches and coral bleaching, is expected
to affect local resources.
 By mid-century, climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands, e.g. in
the Caribbean and Pacific, to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand during low-rainfall
periods.
 With higher temperatures, increased invasion by non-native species is expected to occur, particularly on
mid- and high-latitude islands.
Note:
Unless stated explicitly, all entries are from Working Group II SPM text, and are either very high confidence or high confidence state-
ments, reflecting different sectors (agriculture, ecosystems, water, coasts, health, industry and settlements). The Working Group II SPM
refers to the source of the statements, timelines and temperatures. The magnitude and timing of impacts that will ultimately be realised
will vary with the amount and rate of climate change, emissions scenarios, development pathways and adaptation.
Figure SPM.8. Estimated long-term (multi-century) warming corresponding to the six AR4 Working Group III stabilisation categories (Table
SPM.6). The temperature scale has been shifted by -0.5°C compared to Table SPM.6 to account approximately for the warming between pre-
industrial and 1980-1999. For most stabilisation levels global average temperature is approaching the equilibrium level over a few centuries. For
GHG emissions scenarios that lead to stabilisation at levels comparable to SRES B1 and A1B by 2100 (600 and 850ppm CO2-eq; category IV
and V), assessed models project that about 65 to 70% of the estimated global equilibrium temperature increase, assuming a climate sensitivity
of 3°C, would be realised at the time of stabilisation. For the much lower stabilisation scenarios (category I and II, Figure SPM.11), the equilib-
rium temperature may be reached earlier. {Figure 3.4}
Estimated multi-century warming relative to 1980-1999 for AR4 stabilisation categories
   0                          1                          2                           3                          4                           5                         6  °C
Global average temperature change relative to 1980-1999 (°C)
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Table SPM.3. Examples of possible impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme weather and climate events, based on
projections to the mid- to late 21st century. These do not take into account any changes or developments in adaptive capacity. The
likelihood estimates in column two relate to the phenomena listed in column one. {Table 3.2}
Anthropogenic warming could lead to some impacts
that are abrupt or irreversible, depending upon the rate
and magnitude of the climate change. {3.4}
Partial loss of ice sheets on polar land could imply metres
of sea level rise, major changes in coastlines and inundation
of low-lying areas, with greatest effects in river deltas and
low-lying islands. Such changes are projected to occur over
millennial time scales, but more rapid sea level rise on cen-
tury time scales cannot be excluded. {3.4}
Climate change is likely to lead to some irreversible im-
pacts. There is medium confidence that approximately 20 to
30% of species assessed so far are likely to be at increased
risk of extinction if increases in global average warming ex-
ceed 1.5 to 2.5°C (relative to 1980-1999). As global average
Phenomenona and Likelihood of Examples of major projected impacts by sector
direction of trend future trends
based on Agriculture, forestry Water resources Human health Industry, settlement
projections and ecosystems and society
for 21st century
using SRES
scenarios
Over most land Virtually Increased yields in Effects on water Reduced human Reduced energy demand for
areas, warmer and certainb colder environments; resources relying on mortality from heating; increased demand
fewer cold days decreased yields in snowmelt; effects on decreased cold for cooling; declining air quality
and nights, warmer warmer environments; some water supplies exposure in cities; reduced disruption to
and more frequent increased insect transport due to snow, ice;
hot days and nights outbreaks effects on winter tourism
Warm spells/heat Very likely Reduced yields in Increased water Increased risk of Reduction in quality of life for
waves. Frequency warmer regions demand; water heat-related people in warm areas without
increases over most due to heat stress; quality problems, mortality, especially appropriate housing; impacts
land areas increased danger of e.g. algal blooms for the elderly, on the elderly, very young and
wildfire chronically sick, poor
very young and
socially isolated
Heavy precipitation Very likely Damage to crops; Adverse effects on Increased risk of Disruption of settlements,
events. Frequency soil erosion, inability quality of surface deaths, injuries and commerce, transport and
increases over most to cultivate land due and groundwater; infectious, respiratory societies due to flooding:
areas to waterlogging of contamination of and skin diseases pressures on urban and rural
soils water supply; water infrastructures; loss of property
scarcity may be
relieved
Area affected by Likely Land degradation; More widespread Increased risk of Water shortage for settlements,
drought increases lower yields/crop water stress food and water industry and societies;
damage and failure; shortage; increased reduced hydropower generation
increased livestock risk of malnutrition; potentials; potential for
deaths; increased increased risk of population migration
risk of wildfire water- and food-
borne diseases
Intense tropical Likely Damage to crops; Power outages Increased risk of Disruption by flood and high
cyclone activity windthrow (uprooting) causing disruption deaths, injuries, winds; withdrawal of risk
increases of trees; damage to of public water supply water- and food- coverage in vulnerable areas
coral reefs borne diseases; by private insurers; potential
post-traumatic for population migrations; loss
stress disorders of property
Increased incidence Likely d Salinisation of Decreased fresh- Increased risk of Costs of coastal protection
of extreme high irrigation water, water availability due deaths and injuries versus costs of land-use
sea level (excludes estuaries and fresh- to saltwater intrusion by drowning in floods; relocation; potential for
tsunamis)c water systems migration-related movement of populations and
health effects infrastructure; also see tropical
cyclones above
Notes:
a) See Working Group I Table 3.7 for further details regarding definitions.
b) Warming of the most extreme days and nights each year.
c) Extreme high sea level depends on average sea level and on regional weather systems. It is defined as the highest 1% of hourly values
of observed sea level at a station for a given reference period.
d) In all scenarios, the projected global average sea level at 2100 is higher than in the reference period. The effect of changes in regional
weather systems on sea level extremes has not been assessed.
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temperature increase exceeds about 3.5°C, model projections
suggest significant extinctions (40 to 70% of species assessed)
around the globe. {3.4}
Based on current model simulations, the meridional over-
turning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will very likely
slow down during the 21st century; nevertheless temperatures
over the Atlantic and Europe are projected to increase. The
MOC is very unlikely to undergo a large abrupt transition dur-
ing the 21st century. Longer-term MOC changes cannot be as-
sessed with confidence. Impacts of large-scale and persistent
changes in the MOC are likely to include changes in marine
ecosystem productivity, fisheries, ocean CO2 uptake, oceanic
oxygen concentrations and terrestrial vegetation. Changes in
terrestrial and ocean CO2 uptake may feed back on the cli-
mate system. {3.4}
4. Adaptation and mitigation options14
A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more
extensive adaptation than is currently occurring is re-
quired to reduce vulnerability to climate change. There
are barriers, limits and costs, which are not fully un-
derstood. {4.2}
Societies have a long record of managing the impacts of
weather- and climate-related events. Nevertheless, additional
adaptation measures will be required to reduce the adverse
impacts of projected climate change and variability, regard-
less of the scale of mitigation undertaken over the next two to
three decades. Moreover, vulnerability to climate change can
be exacerbated by other stresses. These arise from, for ex-
ample, current climate hazards, poverty and unequal access to
resources, food insecurity, trends in economic globalisation,
conflict and incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. {4.2}
Some planned adaptation to climate change is already
occurring on a limited basis. Adaptation can reduce vulner-
ability, especially when it is embedded within broader sectoral
initiatives (Table SPM.4). There is high confidence that there
are viable adaptation options that can be implemented in some
sectors at low cost, and/or with high benefit-cost ratios. How-
ever, comprehensive estimates of global costs and benefits of
adaptation are limited. {4.2, Table 4.1}
Adaptive capacity is intimately connected to social and
economic development but is unevenly distributed
across and within societies. {4.2}
A range of barriers limits both the implementation and
effectiveness of adaptation measures. The capacity to adapt is
dynamic and is influenced by a society’s productive base, in-
cluding natural and man-made capital assets, social networks
and entitlements, human capital and institutions, governance,
national income, health and technology. Even societies with
high adaptive capacity remain vulnerable to climate change,
variability and extremes. {4.2}
Both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that
there is high agreement and much evidence of sub-
stantial economic potential for the mitigation of global
GHG emissions over the coming decades that could
offset the projected growth of global emissions or re-
duce emissions below current levels (Figures SPM.9,
SPM.10).15  While top-down and bottom-up studies are
in line at the global level (Figure SPM.9) there are con-
siderable differences at the sectoral level. {4.3}
No single technology can provide all of the mitigation
potential in any sector. The economic mitigation potential,
which is generally greater than the market mitigation poten-
tial, can only be achieved when adequate policies are in place
and barriers removed (Table SPM.5). {4.3}
Bottom-up studies suggest that mitigation opportunities
with net negative costs have the potential to reduce emissions
by around 6 GtCO2-eq/yr in 2030, realising which requires
dealing with implementation barriers. {4.3}
14 While this Section deals with adaptation and mitigation separately, these responses can be complementary. This theme is discussed in
Section 5.
15 The concept of ‘mitigation potential’ has been developed to assess the scale of GHG reductions that could be made, relative to emission
baselines, for a given level of carbon price (expressed in cost per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions avoided or reduced). Mitigation
potential is further differentiated in terms of ‘market mitigation potential’ and ‘economic mitigation potential’.
Market mitigation potential is the mitigation potential based on private costs and private discount rates (reflecting the perspective of private
consumers and companies), which might be expected to occur under forecast market conditions, including policies and measures currently in
place, noting that barriers limit actual uptake.
Economic mitigation potential is the mitigation potential that takes into account social costs and benefits and social discount rates (reflect-
ing the perspective of society; social discount rates are lower than those used by private investors), assuming that market efficiency is
improved by policies and measures and barriers are removed.
Mitigation potential is estimated using different types of approaches. Bottom-up studies are based on assessment of mitigation options,
emphasising specific technologies and regulations. They are typically sectoral studies taking the macro-economy as unchanged. Top-down
studies assess the economy-wide potential of mitigation options. They use globally consistent frameworks and aggregated information about
mitigation options and capture macro-economic and market feedbacks.
15
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Table SPM.4. Selected examples of planned adaptation by sector. {Table 4.1}
Adaptation option/strategy
Expanded rainwater harvesting;
water storage and conservation
techniques; water re-use;
desalination; water-use and
irrigation efficiency
Adjustment of planting dates and
crop variety; crop relocation;
improved land management, e.g.
erosion control and soil protection
through tree planting
Relocation; seawalls and storm
surge barriers; dune reinforce-
ment; land acquisition and
creation of marshlands/wetlands
as buffer against sea level rise
and flooding; protection of existing
natural barriers
Heat-health action plans;
emergency medical services;
improved climate-sensitive
disease surveillance and control;
safe water and improved
sanitation
Diversification of tourism
attractions and revenues; shifting
ski slopes to higher altitudes and
glaciers; artificial snow-making
Ralignment/relocation; design
standards and planning for roads,
rail and other infrastructure to
cope with warming and drainage
Strengthening of overhead
transmission and distribution
infrastructure; underground
cabling for utilities; energy
efficiency; use of renewable
sources; reduced dependence on
single sources of energy
Underlying policy framework
National water policies and
integrated water resources manage-
ment; water-related hazards
management
R&D policies; institutional reform;
land tenure and land reform; training;
capacity building; crop insurance;
financial incentives, e.g. subsidies
and tax credits
Standards and regulations that
integrate climate change consider-
ations into design; land-use policies;
building codes; insurance
Public health policies that recognise
climate risk; strengthened health
services; regional and international
cooperation
Integrated planning (e.g. carrying
capacity; linkages with other
sectors); financial incentives, e.g.
subsidies and tax credits
Integrating climate change consider-
ations into national transport policy;
investment in R&D for special
situations, e.g. permafrost areas
National energy policies, regulations,
and fiscal and financial incentives to
encourage use of alternative
sources; incorporating climate
change in design standards
Key constraints and opportunities
to implementation (Normal font =
constraints; italics = opportunities)
Financial, human resources and
physical barriers; integrated water
resources management; synergies with
other sectors
Technological and financial
constraints; access to new varieties;
markets; longer growing season in
higher latitudes; revenues from ‘new’
products
Financial and technological barriers;
availability of relocation space;
integrated policies and management;
synergies with sustainable development
goals
Limits to human tolerance (vulnerable
groups); knowledge limitations; financial
capacity; upgraded health services;
improved quality of life
Appeal/marketing of new attractions;
financial and logistical challenges;
potential adverse impact on other
sectors (e.g. artificial snow-making may
increase energy use); revenues from
‘new’ attractions; involvement of wider
group of stakeholders
Financial and technological barriers;
availability of less vulnerable routes;
improved technologies and integration
with key sectors (e.g. energy)
Access to viable alternatives; financial
and technological barriers; acceptance
of new technologies; stimulation of new
technologies; use of local resources
Note:
Other examples from many sectors would include early warning systems.
Future energy infrastructure investment decisions, ex-
pected to exceed US$20 trillion16  between 2005 and 2030,
will have long-term impacts on GHG emissions, because of
the long lifetimes of energy plants and other infrastructure
capital stock. The widespread diffusion of low-carbon tech-
nologies may take many decades, even if early investments in
these technologies are made attractive. Initial estimates show
that returning global energy-related CO2 emissions to 2005
levels by 2030 would require a large shift in investment pat-
terns, although the net additional investment required ranges
from negligible to 5 to 10%. {4.3}
Sector
Water
Agriculture
Infrastructure/
settlement
(including
coastal zones)
Human health
Tourism
Transport
Energy
16 20 trillion = 20,000 billion = 20×1012
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Figure SPM.10. Estimated economic mitigation potential by sector in 2030 from bottom-up studies, compared to the respective baselines
assumed in the sector assessments. The potentials do not include non-technical options such as lifestyle changes. {Figure 4.2}
Notes:
a) The ranges for global economic potentials as assessed in each sector are shown by vertical lines. The ranges are based on end-use allocations of
emissions, meaning that emissions of electricity use are counted towards the end-use sectors and not to the energy supply sector.
b) The estimated potentials have been constrained by the availability of studies particularly at high carbon price levels.
c) Sectors used different baselines. For industry, the SRES B2 baseline was taken, for energy supply and transport, the World Energy Outlook
(WEO) 2004 baseline was used; the building sector is based on a baseline in between SRES B2 and A1B; for waste, SRES A1B driving
forces were used to construct a waste-specific baseline; agriculture and forestry used baselines that mostly used B2 driving forces.
d) Only global totals for transport are shown because international aviation is included.
e) Categories excluded are: non-CO2 emissions in buildings and transport, part of material efficiency options, heat production and co-genera-
tion in energy supply, heavy duty vehicles, shipping and high-occupancy passenger transport, most high-cost options for buildings, wastewa-
ter treatment, emission reduction from coal mines and gas pipelines, and fluorinated gases from energy supply and transport. The underes-
timation of the total economic potential from these emissions is of the order of 10 to 15%.
Economic mitigation potentials by sector in 2030 estimated from bottom-up studies
2.4-4.7           1.6-2.5           5.3-6.7         2.5-5.5          2.3-6.4           1.3-4.2            0.4-1.0
total sectoral potential at <US$100/tCO -eq in GtCO -eq/yr:2 2
Energy supply      Transport         Buildings          Industry        Agriculture         Forestry              Waste
World total
Figure SPM.9. Global economic mitigation potential in 2030 estimated from bottom-up (Panel a) and top-down (Panel b) studies, compared with
the projected emissions increases from SRES scenarios relative to year 2000 GHG emissions of 40.8 GtCO2-eq (Panel c). Note: GHG emissions
in 2000 are exclusive of emissions of decay of above ground biomass that remains after logging and deforestation and from peat fires and
drained peat soils, to ensure consistency with the SRES emission results. {Figure 4.1}
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A wide variety of policies and instruments are avail-
able to governments to create the incentives for miti-
gation action. Their applicability depends on national
circumstances and sectoral context (Table SPM.5). {4.3}
They include integrating climate policies in wider devel-
opment policies, regulations and standards, taxes and charges,
tradable permits, financial incentives, voluntary agreements,
information instruments, and research, development and dem-
onstration (RD&D). {4.3}
An effective carbon-price signal could realise significant
mitigation potential in all sectors. Modelling studies show that
global carbon prices rising to US$20-80/tCO2-eq by 2030 are
consistent with stabilisation at around 550ppm CO2-eq by 2100.
For the same stabilisation level, induced technological change
may lower these price ranges to US$5-65/tCO2-eq in 2030.17 {4.3}
There is high agreement and much evidence that mitiga-
tion actions can result in near-term co-benefits (e.g. improved
health due to reduced air pollution) that may offset a substan-
tial fraction of mitigation costs. {4.3}
There is high agreement and medium evidence that Annex
I countries’ actions may affect the global economy and global
emissions, although the scale of carbon leakage remains un-
certain.18  {4.3}
Fossil fuel exporting nations (in both Annex I and non-An-
nex I countries) may expect, as indicated in the TAR, lower de-
mand and prices and lower GDP growth due to mitigation poli-
cies. The extent of this spillover depends strongly on assump-
tions related to policy decisions and oil market conditions. {4.3}
There is also high agreement and medium evidence that
changes in lifestyle, behaviour patterns and management prac-
tices can contribute to climate change mitigation across all sec-
tors. {4.3}
Many options for reducing global GHG emissions
through international cooperation exist. There is high
agreement and much evidence that notable achieve-
ments of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are the
establishment of a global response to climate change,
stimulation of an array of national policies, and the cre-
ation of an international carbon market and new insti-
tutional mechanisms that may provide the foundation
for future mitigation efforts. Progress has also been made
in addressing adaptation within the UNFCCC and addi-
tional international initiatives have been suggested. {4.5}
Greater cooperative efforts and expansion of market mecha-
nisms will help to reduce global costs for achieving a given level
of mitigation, or will improve environmental effectiveness. Ef-
forts can include diverse elements such as emissions targets;
sectoral, local, sub-national and regional actions; RD&D
programmes; adopting common policies; implementing devel-
opment-oriented actions; or expanding financing instruments. {4.5}
In several sectors, climate response options can be
implemented to realise synergies and avoid conflicts
with other dimensions of sustainable development.
Decisions about macroeconomic and other non-climate
policies can significantly affect emissions, adaptive
capacity and vulnerability. {4.4, 5.8}
Making development more sustainable can enhance miti-
gative and adaptive capacities, reduce emissions and reduce
vulnerability, but there may be barriers to implementation. On
the other hand, it is very likely that climate change can slow
the pace of progress towards sustainable development. Over
the next half-century, climate change could impede achieve-
ment of the Millennium Development Goals. {5.8}
5. The long-term perspective
Determining what constitutes “dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system” in relation
to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value judgements.
Science can support informed decisions on this issue,
including by providing criteria for judging which vul-
nerabilities might be labelled ‘key’. {Box ‘Key Vulnerabili-
ties and Article 2 of the UNFCCC’, Topic 5}
Key vulnerabilities19  may be associated with many cli-
mate-sensitive systems, including food supply, infrastructure,
health, water resources, coastal systems, ecosystems, global
biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets and modes of oceanic and
atmospheric circulation. {Box ‘Key Vulnerabilities and Article 2 of
the UNFCCC’, Topic 5}
17 Studies on mitigation portfolios and macro-economic costs assessed in this report are based on top-down modelling. Most models use a
global least-cost approach to mitigation portfolios, with universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and
thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st century. Costs are given for a specific point in time. Global modelled
costs will increase if some regions, sectors (e.g. land use), options or gases are excluded. Global modelled costs will decrease with lower
baselines, use of revenues from carbon taxes and auctioned permits, and if induced technological learning is included. These models do not consider
climate benefits and generally also co-benefits of mitigation measures, or equity issues. Significant progress has been achieved in applying ap-
proaches based on induced technological change to stabilisation studies; however, conceptual issues remain. In the models that consider induced
technological change, projected costs for a given stabilisation level are reduced; the reductions are greater at lower stabilisation level.
18
 Further details may be found in Topic 4 of this Synthesis Report.
19 Key vulnerabilities can be identified based on a number of criteria in the literature, including magnitude, timing, persistence/reversibility, the
potential for adaptation, distributional aspects, likelihood and ‘importance’ of the impacts.
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Summary for Policymakers
The five ‘reasons for concern’ identified in the TAR re-
main a viable framework to consider key vulnerabili-
ties. These ‘reasons’ are assessed here to be stronger
than in the TAR. Many risks are identified with higher con-
fidence. Some risks are projected to be larger or to occur
at lower increases in temperature. Understanding about
the relationship between impacts (the basis for ‘reasons
for concern’ in the TAR) and vulnerability (that includes
the ability to adapt to impacts) has improved. {5.2}
This is due to more precise identification of the circum-
stances that make systems, sectors and regions especially vul-
nerable and growing evidence of the risks of very large im-
pacts on multiple-century time scales. {5.2}
 Risks to unique and threatened systems.  There is new
and stronger evidence of observed impacts of climate
change on unique and vulnerable systems (such as polar
and high mountain communities and ecosystems), with
increasing levels of adverse impacts as temperatures in-
crease further. An increasing risk of species extinction and
coral reef damage is projected with higher confidence than
in the TAR as warming proceeds. There is medium confi-
dence that approximately 20 to 30% of plant and animal
species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of
extinction if increases in global average temperature ex-
ceed 1.5 to 2.5°C over 1980-1999 levels. Confidence has
increased that a 1 to 2°C increase in global mean tem-
perature above 1990 levels (about 1.5 to 2.5°C above pre-
industrial) poses significant risks to many unique and
threatened systems including many biodiversity hotspots.
Corals are vulnerable to thermal stress and have low adap-
tive capacity. Increases in sea surface temperature of about
1 to 3°C are projected to result in more frequent coral
bleaching events and widespread mortality, unless there
is thermal adaptation or acclimatisation by corals. Increasing
vulnerability of indigenous communities in the Arctic and
small island communities to warming is projected. {5.2}
 Risks of extreme weather events.  Responses to some re-
cent extreme events reveal higher levels of vulnerability
than the TAR. There is now higher confidence in the pro-
jected increases in droughts, heat waves and floods, as
well as their adverse impacts. {5.2}
 Distribution of impacts and vulnerabilities.  There are
sharp differences across regions and those in the weakest
economic position are often the most vulnerable to cli-
mate change. There is increasing evidence of greater vul-
nerability of specific groups such as the poor and elderly
not only in developing but also in developed countries.
Moreover, there is increased evidence that low-latitude
and less developed areas generally face greater risk, for
example in dry areas and megadeltas. {5.2}
 Aggregate impacts.  Compared to the TAR, initial net mar-
ket-based benefits from climate change are projected to
peak at a lower magnitude of warming, while damages
would be higher for larger magnitudes of warming. The
net costs of impacts of increased warming are projected
to increase over time. {5.2}
 Risks of large-scale singularities. There is high confi-
dence that global warming over many centuries would lead
to a sea level rise contribution from thermal expansion
alone that is projected to be much larger than observed
over the 20th century, with loss of coastal area and associ-
ated impacts. There is better understanding than in the TAR
that the risk of additional contributions to sea level rise
from both the Greenland and possibly Antarctic ice sheets
may be larger than projected by ice sheet models and could
occur on century time scales. This is because ice dynami-
cal processes seen in recent observations but not fully in-
cluded in ice sheet models assessed in the AR4 could in-
crease the rate of ice loss. {5.2}
There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor
mitigation alone can avoid all climate change impacts;
however, they can complement each other and together
can significantly reduce the risks of climate change. {5.3}
Adaptation is necessary in the short and longer term to ad-
dress impacts resulting from the warming that would occur even
for the lowest stabilisation scenarios assessed. There are barriers,
limits and costs, but these are not fully understood. Unmitigated
climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the
capacity of natural, managed and human systems to adapt. The
time at which such limits could be reached will vary between
sectors and regions. Early mitigation actions would avoid further
locking in carbon intensive infrastructure and reduce climate
change and associated adaptation needs. {5.2, 5.3}
Many impacts can be reduced, delayed or avoided by
mitigation. Mitigation efforts and investments over the
next two to three decades will have a large impact on
opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels. De-
layed emission reductions significantly constrain the
opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels and
increase the risk of more severe climate change im-
pacts. {5.3, 5.4, 5.7}
In order to stabilise the concentration of GHGs in the at-
mosphere, emissions would need to peak and decline thereaf-
ter. The lower the stabilisation level, the more quickly this
peak and decline would need to occur.20  {5.4}
Table SPM.6 and Figure SPM.11 summarise the required
emission levels for different groups of stabilisation concen-
trations and the resulting equilibrium global warming and long-
20 For the lowest mitigation scenario category assessed, emissions would need to peak by 2015, and for the highest, by 2090 (see Table SPM.6).
Scenarios that use alternative emission pathways show substantial differences in the rate of global climate change.
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Table SPM.6. Characteristics of post-TAR stabilisation scenarios and resulting long-term equilibrium global average temperature and
the sea level rise component from thermal expansion only.a {Table 5.1}
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 ppm ppm year percent °C metres
I 350 – 400 445 – 490 2000 – 2015 -85 to -50 2.0 – 2.4 0.4 – 1.4 6
II 400 – 440 490 – 535 2000 – 2020 -60 to -30 2.4 – 2.8 0.5 – 1.7 18
III 440 – 485 535 – 590 2010 – 2030 -30 to +5 2.8 – 3.2 0.6 – 1.9 21
IV 485 – 570 590 – 710 2020 – 2060 +10 to +60 3.2 – 4.0 0.6 – 2.4 118
V 570 – 660 710 – 855 2050 – 2080 +25 to +85 4.0 – 4.9 0.8 – 2.9 9
VI 660 – 790 855 – 1130 2060 – 2090 +90 to +140 4.9 – 6.1 1.0 – 3.7 5
Notes:
a) The emission reductions to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies assessed here might be underesti-
mated due to missing carbon cycle feedbacks (see also Topic 2.3).
b) Atmospheric CO2 concentrations were 379ppm in 2005. The best estimate of total CO2-eq concentration in 2005 for all long-lived
GHGs is about 455ppm, while the corresponding value including the net effect of all anthropogenic forcing agents is 375ppm CO2-eq.
c) Ranges correspond to the 15th to 85th percentile of the post-TAR scenario distribution. CO2 emissions are shown so multi-gas scenarios
can be compared with CO2-only scenarios (see Figure SPM.3).
d) The best estimate of climate sensitivity is 3°C.
e) Note that global average temperature at equilibrium is different from expected global average temperature at the time of stabilisation of
GHG concentrations due to the inertia of the climate system. For the majority of scenarios assessed, stabilisation of GHG concentra-
tions occurs between 2100 and 2150 (see also Footnote 21).
f) Equilibrium sea level rise is for the contribution from ocean thermal expansion only and does not reach equilibrium for at least many
centuries. These values have been estimated using relatively simple climate models (one low-resolution AOGCM and several EMICs
based on the best estimate of 3°C climate sensitivity) and do not include contributions from melting ice sheets, glaciers and ice caps.
Long-term thermal expansion is projected to result in 0.2 to 0.6m per degree Celsius of global average warming above pre-industrial.
(AOGCM refers to Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model and EMICs to Earth System Models of Intermediate Complexity.)
21 Estimates for the evolution of temperature over the course of this century are not available in the AR4 for the stabilisation scenarios. For most
stabilisation levels, global average temperature is approaching the equilibrium level over a few centuries. For the much lower stabilisation
scenarios (category I and II, Figure SPM.11), the equilibrium temperature may be reached earlier.
term sea level rise due to thermal expansion only.21  The tim-
ing and level of mitigation to reach a given temperature
stabilisation level is earlier and more stringent if climate sen-
sitivity is high than if it is low. {5.4, 5.7}
Sea level rise under warming is inevitable. Thermal ex-
pansion would continue for many centuries after GHG con-
centrations have stabilised, for any of the stabilisation levels
assessed, causing an eventual sea level rise much larger than
projected for the 21st century. The eventual contributions from
Greenland ice sheet loss could be several metres, and larger
than from thermal expansion, should warming in excess of
1.9 to 4.6°C above pre-industrial be sustained over many cen-
turies. The long time scales of thermal expansion and ice sheet
response to warming imply that stabilisation of GHG concen-
trations at or above present levels would not stabilise sea level
for many centuries. {5.3, 5.4}
There is high agreement and much evidence that
all stabilisation levels assessed can be achieved by
deployment of a portfolio of technologies that are ei-
ther currently available or expected to be commercialised
in coming decades, assuming appropriate and effec-
tive incentives are in place for their development,
acquisition, deployment and diffusion and addressing
related barriers. {5.5}
All assessed stabilisation scenarios indicate that 60 to 80%
of the reductions would come from energy supply and use
and industrial processes, with energy efficiency playing a key
role in many scenarios. Including non-CO2 and CO2 land-use
and forestry mitigation options provides greater flexibility and
cost-effectiveness. Low stabilisation levels require early invest-
ments and substantially more rapid diffusion and
commercialisation of advanced low-emissions technologies. {5.5}
Without substantial investment flows and effective tech-
nology transfer, it may be difficult to achieve emission reduc-
tion at a significant scale. Mobilising financing of incremen-
tal costs of low-carbon technologies is important. {5.5}
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Figure SPM.11. Global CO2 emissions for 1940 to 2000 and emissions ranges for categories of stabilisation scenarios from 2000 to 2100 (left-
hand panel); and the corresponding relationship between the stabilisation target and the likely equilibrium global average temperature increase
above pre-industrial (right-hand panel). Approaching equilibrium can take several centuries, especially for scenarios with higher levels of stabilisation.
Coloured shadings show stabilisation scenarios grouped according to different targets (stabilisation category I to VI). The right-hand panel
shows ranges of global average temperature change above pre-industrial, using (i) ‘best estimate’ climate sensitivity of 3°C (black line in middle
of shaded area), (ii) upper bound of likely range of climate sensitivity of 4.5°C (red line at top of shaded area) (iii) lower bound of likely range of
climate sensitivity of 2°C (blue line at bottom of shaded area). Black dashed lines in the left panel give the emissions range of recent baseline
scenarios published since the SRES (2000). Emissions ranges of the stabilisation scenarios comprise CO2-only and multigas scenarios and
correspond to the 10th to 90th percentile of the full scenario distribution. Note: CO2 emissions in most models do not include emissions from decay
of above ground biomass that remains after logging and deforestation, and from peat fires and drained peat soils. {Figure 5.1}
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22 See Footnote 17 for more detail on cost estimates and model assumptions.
The macro-economic costs of mitigation generally rise
with the stringency of the stabilisation target (Table
SPM.7). For specific countries and sectors, costs vary
considerably from the global average.22  {5.6}
In 2050, global average macro-economic costs for mitiga-
tion towards stabilisation between 710 and 445ppm CO2-eq are
between a 1% gain and 5.5% decrease of global GDP (Table
SPM.7). This corresponds to slowing average annual global GDP
growth by less than 0.12 percentage points. {5.6}
Table SPM.7. Estimated global macro-economic costs in 2030 and 2050. Costs are relative to the baseline for least-cost trajectories
towards different long-term stabilisation levels. {Table 5.2}
Stabilisation levels Median GDP reductiona (%) Range of GDP reductionb (%) Reduction of average annual GDP
(ppm CO2-eq) growth rates (percentage points) c,e
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030      2050
445 – 535d              Not available < 3 < 5.5 < 0.12      < 0.12
535 – 590 0.6 1.3  0.2 to 2.5 slightly negative to 4 < 0.1      < 0.1
590 – 710 0.2 0.5 -0.6 to 1.2 -1 to 2 < 0.06      < 0.05
Notes:
Values given in this table correspond to the full literature across all baselines and mitigation scenarios that provide GDP numbers.
a) Global GDP based on market exchange rates.
b) The 10th and 90th percentile range of the analysed data are given where applicable. Negative values indicate GDP gain. The first row
(445-535ppm CO2-eq) gives the upper bound estimate of the literature only.
c) The calculation of the reduction of the annual growth rate is based on the average reduction during the assessed period that would
result in the indicated GDP decrease by 2030 and 2050 respectively.
d) The number of studies is relatively small and they generally use low baselines. High emissions baselines generally lead to higher costs.
e) The values correspond to the highest estimate for GDP reduction shown in column three.
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23 Net economic costs of damages from climate change aggregated across the globe and discounted to the specified year.
Responding to climate change involves an iterative risk
management process that includes both adaptation and
mitigation and takes into account climate change dam-
ages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes
to risk. {5.1}
Impacts of climate change are very likely to impose net
annual costs, which will increase over time as global tem-
peratures increase. Peer-reviewed estimates of the social cost
of carbon23  in 2005 average US$12 per tonne of CO2, but the
range from 100 estimates is large (-$3 to $95/tCO2). This is
due in large part to differences in assumptions regarding cli-
mate sensitivity, response lags, the treatment of risk and eq-
uity, economic and non-economic impacts, the inclusion of
potentially catastrophic losses and discount rates. Aggregate
estimates of costs mask significant differences in impacts
across sectors, regions and populations and very likely under-
estimate damage costs because they cannot include many non-
quantifiable impacts. {5.7}
Limited and early analytical results from integrated analy-
ses of the costs and benefits of mitigation indicate that they
are broadly comparable in magnitude, but do not as yet permit
an unambiguous determination of an emissions pathway or
stabilisation level where benefits exceed costs. {5.7}
Climate sensitivity is a key uncertainty for mitigation sce-
narios for specific temperature levels. {5.4}
Choices about the scale and timing of GHG mitigation
involve balancing the economic costs of more rapid emission
reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and
long-term climate risks of delay. {5.7}
